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Kagan’s Atlantic Crossing: Adversarial legalism, Eurolegalism and 
Cooperative Legalism in European Regulatory Style 
Francesca Bignami and R. Daniel Kelemen 
Robert Kagan is known primarily as a scholar of American public law, but Kagan’s studies 
of America have always been informed by a comparative perspective. Though many scholars and 
pundits speak of ‘American exceptionalism,’ Kagan is one of the rare few who understands that 
the truly exceptional features of American politics and law can only be recognized on the basis of 
detailed study of other polities. Early on, Kagan saw that to succeed as an Americanist, he must 
also become a comparativist. He has done so with such success that his work on comparative law 
and regulation not only has contributed to his insights on the US, it also has made landmark 
contributions to the study of law and regulation across Europe and Asia.1 
In this chapter we focus on one particular contribution Kagan has made to the study of law 
and politics in the European Union, namely in stimulating a debate over the potential spread of 
“adversarial legalism’ to Europe. In the mid- to late 1990s, Kagan was in the midst of producing a 
series of papers that would culminate in his path-breaking 2001 book, Adversarial legalism: The 
1 Though our chapter focuses exclusively on the debates Kagan has inspired concerning EU law and regulation, his 
work has also inspired similar debates about legal developments in Asia countries (See for instance Kelemen and 
Sibbitt 2002, Johnson 2003, Nelken 2003, Ginsburg 2008, Baharvar 2006-7). 
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American Way of Law. In this work, he developed a concept, ‘adversarial legalism,’ that captured 
the distinctive features of American legal and regulatory style and he explained the origins and 
persistence of that style. As part of his research, he engaged in comparative studies of regulation 
in European countries, highlighting the advantages many enjoyed as compared to the US in terms 
of being more cooperative and informal and avoiding protracted and expensive legal battles. While 
highlighting these differences, however, he recognized some pressures for movement toward 
American-style regulation in Europe. This led him to question whether it was likely that American-
style adversarial legalism – with all the costly pathologies that accompany it – might take root in 
Europe. As Kagan (1997) put it succinctly in the title of a 1997 paper, “Should Europe worry about 
adversarial legalism?” 
Kagan answered the question in the negative, emphasizing that entrenched legal 
institutions and cultures would prevent adversarial legalism from taking root in Europe. Some 
years later, R. Daniel Kelemen picked up on Kagan’s question, but reached the conclusion that a 
legal style akin to adversarial legalism – one which he eventually termed Eurolegalism – was in 
fact spreading across the European Union (Kelemen and Sibbitt 2004; Kelemen 2006, 2011, 2012, 
2013). In a 2007 paper, Kagan responded, challenging Kelemen’s arguments by further developing 
the arguments presented in his 1997 “Should Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism?” paper, 
again emphasizing that a number of ‘entrenched differences’ would prevent the spread of 
adversarial legalism in Europe (Kagan 2007). In a 2011 paper, Francesca Bignami extended the 
debate in a new direction, drawing on a case study of the data privacy field to suggest that EU 
regulation may be characterized by a pattern of cooperative legalism rather than adversarial 
legalism (Bignami 2011). Together, such contributions have given rise to a lively debate, with a 
number of other scholars adding empirical studies and theoretical arguments concerning the impact 
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of the EU on national regulatory styles and exploring whether or not, or in which respects and to 
what extent, aspects of adversarial legalism may be spreading to Europe (See for instance, Bignami 
2011, Cioffi 2009, Mabbett 2011, Meyerstein 2013, Rehder, 2009, van Waarden 2009). This 
debate has helped build analytic bridges across the Atlantic, enabling scholars of the US and 
Europe to compare trends in regulation in both contexts. 
In this chapter we summarize this debate, highlighting the enduring importance of Kagan’s 
conceptual contribution to the study of regulation in Europe. We begin by summarizing Kagan’s 
main arguments about regulatory style in Europe and why US style-adversarial legalism was 
unlikely to take root in Europe. We then engage in a dialogue, presenting both Kelemen’s argument 
that European integration is encouraging the spread of a variant of adversarial legalism—
“Eurolegalism”--and Bignami’s argument that distinctive features of national regulatory regimes 
prevent the spread of adversarial legalism in Europe and instead lead to the spread of an alternative 
pattern of “cooperative legalism”. We then conclude by linking the discussion of our own work 
with other important contributions to the debate on regulation in Europe inspired by Kagan’s work. 
Kagan on Why Europe Shouldn’t Worry About Adversarial Legalism 
Kagan famously labeled the distinctive American legal style as “adversarial legalism.” He 
framed the exceptionalism of the American “way of law” by comparison with legal styles in 
European countries and other advanced industrialized countries. He captured some central 
elements of the distinction between adversarial legalism and European legal styles in the following 
passage that is worth quoting at length: 
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“Viewed in relation to Western European governments (including the UK), the 
USA has developed a distinctive ‘‘legal style’’ – by which I mean its way of 
making, crafting, and implementing laws and regulations, conducting litigation, 
adjudicating disputes, and using courts. American laws generally are more detailed, 
complicated, and prescriptive. American methods of litigating and adjudicating 
legal disputes are more adversarial and costly. Legalistic enforcement is much more 
prevalent in American regulatory programs. American judges generally are bolder 
in scrutinizing and reversing governmental plans, regulations, practices, and 
decisions. Interest groups in the USA, consequently, more often use courts as an 
alternative political forum for seeking policy goals.” (Kagan 2007, pp. 102-103). 
 
In comparison to this distinctive American legal style, the legal styles that prevailed across 
European jurisdictions, while each distinct in many respects, tended to be more informal, 
cooperative, and opaque and less reliant on lawyers, courts, and private enforcement actions. 
Kagan recognized in his 1997 article that there were new pressures that might encourage 
adversarial legalism in Europe including international economic competition, competition in legal 
services, privatization and deregulation, growing political mistrust of government power, the 
‘federalization’ of regulation in the EU, and political gridlock (Kagan 1997, pp. 171-179). Despite 
the existence of such pressures, however, Kagan concluded in his 1997 article and subsequent 
work that entrenched institutions and legal cultures in EU member states would discourage the 
spread of adversarial legalism to European countries (Kagan 1997, 2007). Moreover, he noted that 
the very fact that the pathologies of American style adversarial legalism were well known to 
Europeans would make them vigilant against the rise of that mode of regulation in Europe.  As he 
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put it in his 2007 article, “Globalization and legal change: The “Americanization” of European 
Law?”, six entrenched differences distinguishing the US legal system from its European 
counterparts would ensure that the latter would not experience ‘Americanization’ of their legal 
systems. Specifically, he highlighted 1) the political nature and remedial powers of American 
judiciaries, 2) the pervasiveness of adversarial legalism in the regulatory process, 3) the 
hyperactive American tort law system, 4) the more limited rights to social provision in the USA, 
5) the less demanding American tax laws, and 6) the punitiveness and adversarial legalism in 
American criminal justice as crucial enduring differences.  
 Kagan’s foray into the study of European legal styles was seminal in that it has stimulated 
a lively debate about whether, and if so why, legal styles in European countries may be shifting 
toward something akin to adversarial legalism. Next each of us presents our own arguments on 
this question. 
 
Kelemen on Eurolegalism 
In a series of articles (Kelemen and Sibbitt 2004, Kelemen 2006, 2008, 2012) and in my 
2011 book Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European Union, I 
argue that the process of European integration is transforming traditional patterns of law and 
regulation across EU Member States and pushing them towards a European variant of adversarial 
legalism, which I term Eurolegalism.2 I argue that European integration is promoting the spread of 
Eurolegalism through two linked causal mechanisms, one economic and one political. 
The first mechanism involves the process of deregulation and juridical reregulation linked 
to the creation of the EU’s single market. As the EU pursued its 1992 single market project, 
                                                          
2 In fact, the very term Eurolegalism was suggested to me by Professor Kagan. I remain deeply grateful for this catchy 
suggestion. 
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traditional, informal national styles of regulation based on closed, insider networks and trust that 
had prevailed in European countries came to be seen as barriers to market integration. They were 
dismantled in field after field, sometimes as a result of EU policy initiatives that demanded 
liberalization and sometimes as the result of European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments that ruled 
national regulations to be illegal non-tariff barriers to trade in the single market. But the EU did 
not stop with deregulation. In order to pursue their policy objectives, EU policy makers also sought 
to reregulate, to replace problematic national regulatory regimes with pan-European regimes 
compatible with the functioning of the Single Market. But the new EU regulatory regimes did not 
resemble traditional European styles of informal, cooperative regulation. Facing a greater volume 
and diversity of actors in the liberalized market and demands for a level playing field, EU 
lawmakers rely on regulatory frameworks that are more formal, inflexible, and judicialized. In 
short, the EU followed a pattern established in other polities whereby the creation of ‘freer 
markets’ actually requires ‘more rules’ and where deregulation is followed by ‘juridical 
reregulation’ (S. Vogel 1996). 
 The second causal mechanism stems from the political fragmentation that characterizes the 
EU’s institutional framework. When EU policy-makers ‘reregulate’ at the European level, they do 
so within an institutional structure that generates political incentives to rely on a judicialized mode 
of governance. Political power in the EU is highly fragmented – divided horizontally between the 
Commission, Council and Parliament – and vertically between the EU and member state 
administrations. The fragmentation of political power in the EU generates principal-agent 
problems and breeds distrust between law-makers and the national administrations that implement 
most EU policy.  The EU also has extremely weak administrative capacity, but does have a 
relatively strong judicial system under the leadership of the ECJ. This combination of political 
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fragmentation, weak administrative capacity and effective judicial institutions encourages policy-
makers to enact laws with justiciable provisions and to encourage the Commission and private 
litigants to enforce them before European and national courts. In other words, EU policy makers 
seek to harness national and European courts and private litigants to help make up for their lack of 
central administrative capacity. This decentralized enforcement, backed by enforcement actions 
taken by the Commission before European Courts, helps to safeguard the implementation of EU 
policies across the large and fragmented European polity.  
 I recognize Kagan’s (2007) point that a number of institutions entrenched at the national 
level in EU states continue to discourage adversarial legalism. He highlights the absence of jury 
trials, contingency fees, and massive damage awards in European systems of tort law, lower degree 
of politicization of European judiciaries, and the existence across Europe of more generous public 
social and medical services as examples of entrenched institutions that will discourage the rise of 
adversarial legalism in Europe. Consider for instance the fact that decentralized, private 
enforcement of legal norms is an important aspect of adversarial legalism. As Kagan rightly 
emphasizes, many rules of civil procedure in national legal systems across Europe discourage 
private enforcement. For example, the absence of contingency fee arrangements and American-
style opt-out class actions in most European jurisdictions raises the cost of litigation, while the 
absence of remedies such as punitive damage awards often reduces the potential rewards of 
successful litigation. The fact that many potential litigants across the EU face higher costs and 
lower potential awards discourages them from seeking to enforce their rights under EU law in 
court.   
  However, while such impediments continue to channel and constrain the spread of 
adversarial legalism, they do not block it entirely. A number of the traditional impediments to 
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adversarial legalism in Europe – such as entrenched rules of civil procedure or patterns of 
organization in the legal profession – are themselves eroding under pressures generated by 
European integration. Having introduced a voluminous body of EU law – the so-called acquis 
communautaire – that establishes a wide range of rights and other legally enforceable norms, the 
EU now increasingly emphasizes that European citizens and other legal persons (ie firms) must 
enjoy better access to justice such that they can enforce these rights. To this end, the EU is leading 
a multi-pronged effort to create a “Genuine European Area of Justice” - improving access to justice 
and promoting the harmonization of procedural laws across the EU so as to facilitate private 
enforcement (Kelemen 2011, p. 58, Hartnell 2002, Hodges 2007). EU initiatives and related legal 
developments in this field have affected various aspects of litigation financing (eg legal aid, 
conditional fee arrangements and third party litigation financing) and procedures governing 
collective (group) litigation.3  Taken together these measures are inducing a change in the litigation 
landscape across Europe that is facilitating the spread of Eurolegalism.   
 Moreover, my argument that European integration is encouraging the spread of a mode of 
governance – Eurolegalism – that involves greater reliance on formal law, lawyers, and litigation, 
does not suggest that EU governance is identical to American-style adversarial legalism. I am not 
arguing that Eurolegalism mimics American adversarial legalism in all respects or that it has 
already seeped into every nook and cranny of law and regulation across all EU member states. 
Rather, to paraphrase Lord Denning famous description of EU treaty law,4 I am arguing that 
Eurolegalism is an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held 
back, and it is transforming governance across a wide range of policy areas. As a result of the sort 
                                                          
3 Traditionally, because American style contingency fees have been prohibited in European jurisdictions, litigants 
were discouraged by the potentially high costs of litigation. However, a number of recent developments have 
established new funding schemes for litigation that reduce the costs to plaintiffs. (See Kelemen 2011, pp. 58, 2013). 
4 See HP Bulmer Ltd v J Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401 at 418. 
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of institutional impediments Kagan identifies, the European variant of adversarial legalism – 
Eurolegalism – is and will likely remain more restrained and sedate than the American version and 
will affect some policy areas and some member states less than others. Despite the reforms 
mentioned above, persistent differences between civil procedures in the US and EU mean that we 
will not see the sort of lawyer-driven, contingency-fee financed, class actions in Europe that are 
so common in the US in fields ranging from securities law to product liability. And the increases 
in private enforcement we are seeing in Europe will vary significantly across policy area, with 
private parties more quick to take up new opportunities to assert their EU rights in court in fields 
such as securities and antitrust (where potential litigants tend to be well resourced corporations or 
investors) than in the field of disability rights (where potential litigants tend to be workers of 
modest means who have been victims of discrimination).  
But such variations across policy areas and across jurisdictions do not take away from the 
broader point that Eurolegalism is spreading. And the fact that Eurolegalism is not synonymous 
with American adversarial legalism does not take away from the point that legal style in the EU is 
shifting in an American direction.  In my 2011 book (Kelemen 2011) documenting the EU’s 
influence on the spread of Eurolegalism, I take the mid-1980s as a baseline for all quantitative 
measures and case studies and assessing shifts in regulatory style from traditional European forms 
toward Eurolegalism over the next two decades. I highlight cross-cutting indicators of the shift in 
legal style including aggregate data on legal activity, such as litigation rates, spending on legal 
services and legal expenses insurance. I also look at qualitative changes in the civil and 
administrative procedures, such as the spread of class action lawsuits and conditional fee 
arrangements, which reflect and contribute to the spread of Eurolegalism. Finally, I also conduct 
case studies of particular policy areas in which I trace shifts in legal style toward Eurolegalism in 
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securities regulation, competition law and disability rights both at the EU level and in the UK, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. In these case studies, I use process tracing to demonstrate 
that legal and regulatory styles in Europe in these fields have shifted from traditional styles of 
regulation towards Eurolegalism, and to demonstrate that the causal mechanisms behind these 
shifts are those anticipated by my theory. 
 
 
Bignami on Cooperative Legalism 
Turning to the argument that, paraphrasing Kagan, Europeans shouldn’t worry about 
adversarial legalism, this section presents evidence from my own research and that of others that 
support a different pattern of regulatory change―what I call cooperative legalism.  The reason, I 
suggest below, for this somewhat surprising outcome is to be found in the operation of the two 
causal mechanisms outlined above: the theorization of market liberalization and political 
fragmentation in Kagan and Kelemen is heavily influenced by the distinctive American experience 
with these two phenomena and, as it turns out, when transposed to a different political and 
institutional context, they produce quite different outcomes, most significantly a less prominent 
role for courts in regulatory policymaking.     
To understand the nature of regulatory change in the Europe, it is helpful to unpack the 
category of adversarial legalism into the two dimensions identified in Kagan’s original typology 
of modes of policy implementation and dispute resolution.   The first dimension captures the extent 
to which decisions are driven by horizontally situated parties (participatory) or hierarchically 
superior officialdom (hierarchical).  The second captures the degree to which government 
decisions are based on the rigid application of a dense set of legal rules and sanctions (formal) or 
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the discretionary exercise of loosely defined authority (informal).  Policy implementation in the 
United States is classified as “adversarial legalism” because it generally is party-driven in the 
context of an extensive, formal set of rules and procedures that generate considerable litigation.     
In my study of EU data privacy regulation from the mid-1970s to 2010, I find evidence of 
adversarial legalism across the four country cases (UK, Italy, France, Germany) only on the 
formality dimension and not on the party-driven dimension.  In all four countries, the law was 
reworked to contain more extensive investigatory and sanctioning powers and these powers were 
being used by data privacy regulators, in particular in France and Italy, suggesting a move, as 
Kagan had predicted, from an informal and consensual style of regulatory enforcement to a more 
legalistic and punitive approach. On the party-driven dimension, I find a trend toward more party 
participation, but through self-regulation, not rights-driven contestation and litigation as in the US.  
Self-regulation represents continuity for the UK and Germany, systems known for certain neo-
corporatist practices, but signifies a shift for France and Italy which have a reputation for top-down 
administration with little role for interest groups. Neo-corporatism involves a significant role for 
representative interest associations in policy implementation, either alone or in tripartite settings 
generally composed of labor, industry, and government representatives.   Self-regulation, which 
entails the exercise of regulatory powers by market actors, can be undertaken by the same industry 
and professional associations that are central to neo-corporatism.  Even in those instances in which 
self-regulation is undertaken by different types of market actors, such as individual firms, the 
division of public-private power resonates with neo-corporatist institutional arrangements. 
Although Kagan does not address directly self-regulation, adversarial legalism’s formality 
dimension of detailed rules and little administrative discretion, together with its rights-driven 
model of public participation, suggest that there is little room for the flexible and context-sensitive 
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approaches to implementation that self-regulation is designed to foster.  Because of this pattern of 
continuity (i.e. little litigation) and change (i.e. more legalistic rule enforcement and more self-
regulation in certain member states) in the data privacy case, I conclude that European regulatory 
systems are converging on a style of “cooperative legalism.”  
The data privacy case, as well as some of the other empirical work reviewed below 
(Bellantuono 2014, Cioffi 2009, Bastings, Mastenbroek and Versluis 2014, Van Cleynenbreugel 
2014, Hodges 2014, Van Waarden and Hildebrand 2009), point to three difficulties with the 
theoretical framework of adversarial legalism and suggest ways of refining our understanding of 
the ongoing phenomenon of shifting regulatory styles in Europe.  As described earlier, the 
adversarial legalism hypothesis is premised on the causal factors of market liberalization and 
political fragmentation. What these studies suggest, however, is that the logic of these causal 
factors operates differently in the American and European contexts and therefore some of what is 
believed to be universal to the phenomena of market liberalization and political fragmentation, in 
particular adversarial litigation, may be particular to the American historical experience. 
The first difficulty with the adversarial legalism hypothesis concerns the market 
liberalization prong.   In his original piece, Kagan suggested that more rules give rise to more legal 
fights about the rules inside administration and in the courts (Kagan 1997, pp. 173 175). However, 
both his comparative typology of modes of policy implementation, which includes the classic 
Weberian category of bureaucratic legalism, as well as some of the evidence from the European 
experience with market liberalization, suggest that there is an alternative way of governing with a 
dense body of rules—bureaucratic administration of rules by government authorities. For market 
liberalization to work and for the normative commitments of the rule of law to be met, the rules 
must be transparent and be subject to oversight by an independent judicial body but they do not 
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necessarily have to be crafted through a long and drawn-out process of adversarial contestation.  
This, as I briefly review below, is the form of regulatory governance that appears to be taking hold 
in a number of sectors in the EU.  
Similar to the data privacy sector, many of the regulatory schemes introduced with market 
liberalization and re-regulation involve a central role for a newly created (or newly empowered) 
national regulatory authority endowed with extensive policymaking and enforcement powers:  
competition authorities (Maher 2000), telecommunications authorities (Thatcher 2007), energy 
authorities (Thatcher 2007, pp. 209-230, Bellantuono 2014, pp.16-17), financial services 
authorities (Thatcher 2007, pp. 90-118, Cioffi 2009, pp. 248), and environmental authorities 
(Bastings et al. 2014, p. 14) among others.   Although it is difficult to obtain systematic 
comparative data on how these new enforcement powers are being used, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that, as in the privacy field, they are indeed being deployed by regulators, producing a 
more formal and punitive style of regulatory enforcement (See, e.g., Michel Faur et al., 2008, 
Bastings et al., 2014). To date, however, there is little evidence that these new regulatory powers 
have been accompanied by more contestation by the parties and their lawyers in administrative 
agencies and the courts.5  It is true that because regulatory authorities now have the power to 
impose significant administrative sanctions, including heavy fines, they have also had to afford 
regulated parties due process rights in the administrative process and their decisions have been 
subject to challenge in the courts (Van Cleynenbreugel 2014, pp.11-21). But this development 
should be seen as part and parcel of the transfer of sanctioning powers from the criminal justice 
system―which in many jurisdictions previously had the exclusive power to impose fines and other 
                                                          
5 One exception appears to be certain areas of land-use planning and environmental regulation, where the Aarhus 
requirement of affording participation in the preparation of environmental impact statements has given rise to the right 
to participate in and challenge certain types of agency policymaking (See Nadal 2008).  
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types of sanctions for regulatory offenses and which obviously had a highly developed set of 
guarantees for defendants―to administrative agencies, which are capable of pursuing regulatory 
offenses in a more single-minded fashion but in many cases do not possess a developed procedural 
framework.  It does not appear that this proceduralization of enforcement has spread to the rest of 
agency policymaking and rulemaking activities.  For instance, financial markets regulators have 
been under significant pressure from constitutional and administrative courts to improve the rights 
available to individual firms in the course of their investigations and enforcement proceedings6 but 
their policymaking activities, which often do involve public consultations, are not bound by strict 
procedural rules.  This stands in stark contrast with the regulations issued by the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission which are formulated through the adversarial American rulemaking 
process and are subject to intense and often unpredictable judicial review in the courts.7    
The second difficulty with the original theoretical framework relates to the causal factor of 
political structure and the analogy that has been drawn between the EU political system and US 
federalism.  Kagan argued that one of the causes of adversarial legalism in the US was the 
mismatch between a highly ambitious federal policy agenda and an underdeveloped federal 
administrative state, which led lawmakers to rely extensively on state and local authorities for 
implementation, and to write legislation giving litigants the right to go to court, both to monitor 
and challenge state implementation and to independently enforce federal policy in court.  Kagan, 
as later developed by Kelemen, speculated that since the EU was also marked by a lack of federal 
                                                          
6 See, for example, Grandes Stevens et al. v. Italy, nos. 18640/10, 18647/10, 18663/10, 18668/10, 18698/1, European 
Court of Human Rights, July 7, 2014. 
7 See, for example, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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administrative capacity and the fragmentation of state power, EU lawmakers would write similar 
legal rights into EU law (Kagan 1997, pp.177-78). 
The weakness of the argument is that it mischaracterizes to some extent the nature of the 
EU lawmaking process.  EU lawmaking is called “harmonization” for a reason.  When the EU 
enters a new policy area it does not regulate from tabula rasa but rather operates in the context of 
a thick regulatory field, which generally contains a number of highly developed national 
administrative and legal schemes.  In contrast with US lawmaking, which is controlled by elected 
politicians who write legislation, including the rights-conferring legislation described by Kagan, 
to produce certain kinds of policies and therefore win votes (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999), the 
EU legislative process is structured to include a wide array of actors and incentives.  One set of 
actors that does not have a US equivalent are the national governments represented in the Council, 
which are at least partially motivated by the desire to preserve their existing national schemes—
and regulatory styles—by uploading them into EU legislation (Börzel 2002). The older and more 
powerful member states, like France and Germany, which generally have both policy experience 
and bargaining clout, are very often able to do so.  Following this logic, member states should have 
little incentive to support a foreign regulatory style in harmonization instruments and can be 
expected to oppose attempts to introduce elements of adversarial legalism by other legislative 
actors, most notably the Commission, which may very well be driven by the same enforcement 
incentives as US legislators.  To the extent the member states seek to control national 
administrations and overcome the principal-agent problem identified by Kelemen in the previous 
section, they can use tools that are more congenial to their traditional regulatory styles (and 
possibly more effective) than private litigants and courts. Kagan very rightly anticipated that 
adversarial legalism would encounter resistance from national legal cultures and political 
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structures but this analysis suggests that national traditions run even deeper:  they undercut one of 
the critical sources of adversarial legalism, suggesting that it never had a fighting change to being 
with.      
The drafting of the first EU directive on data protection is one example of how member 
states stymied European Commission attempts to improve litigation rights for privacy violations 
(Bignami 2011, p.438). The best illustration to date of legislative resistance, however, is the 
ongoing effort to introduce a class action for mass consumer torts in the EU.  In the consumer 
protection area, the Commission has articulated what Christopher Hodges (2014, pp.69-70) calls 
a three-pillar policy of alternative dispute resolution, enhanced authority for consumer protection 
agencies, and collective redress to obtain compensation in the courts for consumer harms. To date, 
however, progress has been mostly been achieved on alternative dispute resolution and 
administrative enforcement, while collective redress has lagged behind.  The only concrete action 
that has been produced in over five years of institutional debate is a Commission Recommendation 
adopted in June 2013 exhorting the member states to introduce some form of collective redress 
mechanism, and a fairly weak one at that, which repudiates many of the key elements of the 
American system.  One of the reasons for this lack of legislative action is continued opposition 
from the majority of member states in the Council, coupled with what Kagan called the “inherent 
reflexiveness of human political and legal systems,” namely the express desire articulated by both 
the European Parliament and the European Commission to avoid the pathologies of the American 
experience with class action litigation (Hodges 2014, p.83). The result is that the current consumer 
protection regime hews closely to the regulatory style of cooperative legalism: a significant role 
for public, administrative enforcement, widespread resort to alternative dispute settlement through 
17 
 
the traditional informal institutions of ombudsmen and neo-corporatist bodies, as well as newer 
market-based institutions, and relatively little litigation (id. at 81). 
The third correction suggested by some of the recent empirical work relates to the 
particularities of the EU legislative process described above.  The importance of national 
regulatory templates for legislative outcomes points not only to the EU’s intrinsic hostility to 
adversarial legalism but also suggests that EU legislation should be conceptualized somewhat 
differently from US legislation—as a set of compromises between national regulatory models with 
elements of adversarial legalism inserted, if at all, on the fringes.  If this is the case, then it might 
be more appropriate to conceive of the legalistic elements of EU regulation as a reflection of, or at 
least consistent with, the regulatory styles of a certain subset of powerful member states, which 
require change in the direction of adversarial legalism in other, but by no means not all, member 
states.  In other words, the degree of transformation of regulatory styles may vary significantly by 
member state, and the transformations that do occur may reflect not the emergence of a novel, 
adversarial and legalistic mode of regulation, but rather convergence on a dominant, European 
style.  
To again illustrate with data privacy, among the four countries included in my study, the 
UK system began as the most informal one, due to a combination of the traditional UK policy style 
and a foot-dragging approach to the substantive issue of privacy:  in the 1980s, the administrative 
authority responsible for data protection had very few regulatory and enforcement powers and 
individuals were given virtually no legal rights to sue in the courts.  Following the passage of the 
EU directive, which was largely a hybrid of the French and German models, the UK system was 
transformed more thoroughly in the direction of adversarial legalism than any of the others in the 
study.  The data protection authority acquired rulemaking powers for the first time and obtained a 
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host of new enforcement tools, including the power to impose stiff administrative fines.  In 
addition, a general right of action was added to the British privacy legislation and therefore 
individuals became entitled to sue in court for any type of privacy violation.  The institutional 
practices of both the data protection authority and the courts reflected these legal changes.   
Other research suggests that the Dutch system as a whole is vulnerable to change because 
of its extremely informal and pragmatic traditional regulatory style, which has made it an outlier 
even among European states.  For instance, in their study on regulatory enforcement of the EU 
packaging waste directive in the Netherlands and Germany, Bastings and her co-authors show that 
the German system, which was reflected in the directive, remained stable and legalistic, while the 
previously “passive” Dutch style morphed into a legalistic style (Bastings et al. 2014). More 
generally, Van Waarden and Hildebrand have documented how the Netherlands in the 1970s 
represented the informal and consensual extreme of the spectrum, especially when compared to 
countries like Germany and Austria, and how it has since experienced a dramatic rate of growth in 
lawyers, legal insurance, administrative litigation, and civil litigation, so that it has largely caught 
up with its neighbors, albeit with distinctively Dutch neo-corporatist elements (van Waarden and 
Hildebrand 2009).  
There is also evidence that for their own, distinct national reasons, certain member states 
may be more litigation friendly than others.  A recent study on the compensation of asbestos 
victims showed that while the courts played absolutely no role in Belgium, in the UK there were 
significant levels of personal injury litigation, and in Italy victims sometimes obtained 
compensation for damages in criminal prosecutions (Boggio 2013). Similarly, in his otherwise 
quite muted assessment of how collective redress procedures have been and will be used in national 
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jurisdictions, Hodges (2014, p.83) singles out the UK and Italy, together with Poland and, for 
settlements, the Netherlands as potential “hot spots” for consumer litigation. 
In sum, although market liberalization and Europeanization have certainly altered national 
regulatory styles, they have done so more by enhancing deterrence-oriented enforcement of rules 
by administrative authorities than by increasing contestation in the administrative process or 
through the courts.   While, as suggested by some of Kelemen’s analysis, litigation may become 
more pervasive in domains such as competition law and corporate law, where the financial stakes 
are high and the impact of market liberalization is particularly significant, it is unlikely to emerge 
as the dominant force in European regulatory governance.  Among the many contributions of 
Kagan’s scholarship, his comparative frame has pushed others to grapple with the question of what 
is intrinsic to regulation in liberal markets and fragmented polities—undoubtedly global trends 
that impact not only the EU but jurisdictions throughout the world―and what is exceptional to 
regulation in the US.  My own view of the evidence so far is that a certain degree of legalization, 
largely enforced by administrative authorities, is inevitable but that the pervasive contestation of 
regulatory policymaking characteristic of the US is the product of a distinctive historical 
experience with the law and politics of the regulatory state.   
 
Conclusion 
The debate provoked by Kagan’s comparative insights has by no means been settled.  It is 
possible, however, to identify a number of areas of consensus as to the nature of regulatory change 
in Europe.  First, it is fairly clear that the increasingly dense set of rules coming from Brussels is 
being applied by special-purpose national regulatory authorities that have acquired new 
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enforcement powers and that have moved towards a more legalistic and punitive style of regulatory 
enforcement. In doing so, these agencies have experienced significant proceduralization of their 
enforcement activities: administrative bodies like competition authorities, banking regulators, and 
data protection agencies have had to create internal divisions responsible for conducting 
adversarial proceedings that can potentially result in heavy-duty fines and other forms of 
administrative sanctions and that can be, and often are, challenged in court.  Second, in some policy 
areas, and in some countries, litigation invoking the rights and duties of regulatory statutes has 
become more prominent.  This is the case for policy sectors like competition law and securities 
regulation where liberalization has had a direct and profound impact on the organization of markets 
(and market actors with the financial incentives to litigate regulatory claims).  This is also the case 
for countries like the Netherlands, which were previously extremely informal and consensual even 
by European standards, and countries like Italy, which for distinct domestic reasons have 
experienced a rise in regulatory litigation.     
Of course, we, and the many others engaged in this area of inquiry, also differ in our 
assessment of the current state of affairs and the likely future trajectory of European regulation.  
The main point of difference concerns the role of rights and litigation in shaping regulation across 
the policymaking cycle (from general norms to enforcement of those norms in specific cases) and 
the policymaking spectrum (across all policy areas).  While Eurolegalism takes the view that 
litigants and courts have already become and will continue to become major players across a wide 
range of policy areas, cooperative legalism sees the balance of power as remaining in the hands of 
administrative authorities, especially at the rulemaking phase and in areas involving diffuse 
interest such as consumers and the environment. Even here, as the labels suggest, there is overlap, 
since both acknowledge that national institutions and legal traditions constitute obstacles to the 
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diffusion of adversarial legalism.  In Kelemen’s assessment, however, national traditions are a 
stumbling block that stands in the way of the advance of adversarial legalism. In Bignami’s 
assessment, on the other hand, national traditions operate as a central element of regulating a 
liberalized and fragmented policy space.  In a number of sectors, European lawmakers have 
adapted their existing (non-adversarial) legal toolkit to the new realities of European integration 
and they are likely to continue to do so going forward, significantly reducing the likelihood that 
adversarial administrative proceedings and court litigation will come to serve as the dominant 
mode of policy implementation in Europe.   
Settling this debate outlined above will require careful studies of specific policy areas, 
involving accurate quantitative measures of regulatory litigation and covering a wide range of 
countries.  It is an issue of importance not only for understanding the evolution of regulation in 
Europe, but also a host of other regions across the globe in which the twin phenomena of the 
regulatory state and the empowerment of transnational and international bodies are transforming 
the status quo. At stake are the types of government institutions and public and private 
professionals that will be empowered to make the resource- distributing and market-stabilizing 
policy decisions of the regulatory state, with all of the consequences so vividly revealed by Kagan.   
The difference, put in the starkest terms, is between specialized bureaucracies, on the one hand, 
and generalist judges and partisan litigators, on the other hand.  Which is preferable depends to 
some extent on how close historically and geographically situated government institutions come 
to our ideal types of bureaucracies and courts.  It also depends on how convincing one finds the 
normative dimension of Kagan’s work. 
Another question for further research is the relationship between the increasing legalism of 
European regulation and informal and flexible modes of regulatory governance.  At the same time 
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as Kelemen was documenting the rise of Eurolegalism, a number of other scholars were focusing 
on the increasing popularity in the European Union of “new modes of governance,” namely 
discretionary forms of regulation that allow administrators considerable flexibility in how to 
interpret regulatory norms and that entrust the regulated parties with significant responsibility for 
implementing those norms.  In cooperative legalism, as illustrated by the data privacy and 
consumer protection cases, the two forms of regulatory governance—legalistic and self-
regulatory—co-exist.   There is no doubt, however, that this is a somewhat paradoxical 
development:  top-down agency enforcement and cooperative public-private problem-solving are 
generally pitted as alternative, not complementary, regulatory techniques.  Public enforcement 
implies fixed legal duties with which market actors are asked to comply whereas self-regulation 
requires flexible, general public norms that are supplemented through private-sector initiatives.  In 
response to this puzzle, Kelemen has argued that new modes of governance are a “red herring.” 
He contends that they constitute peripheral experiments in governance that have been much 
discussed by academics but that have had little impact in practice. He argues that attention to these 
experiments in new governance detract attention from the more pervasive shift to more legalistic 
regulation—Eurolegalism--across the European policy space (Idema and Kelemen 2006). This 
certainly is one possibility, but there are others too: some of the research undertaken on efforts to 
introduce flexible regulation in the American context suggests that hard and soft governance can 
interact in productive ways (Short and Toffel 2010), while the literature on institutional change 
highlights the possibility that old forms of European self-regulation may be retooled without being 
entirely abandoned (Streeck and Thelen 2006). Like adversarial litigation, the question of how 
hard and soft forms of regulation interact over time will require careful case studies, the results of 
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which have implications not only for Europe but for the development of the regulatory state in a 
number of other regional settings. 
The vibrancy of this ongoing debate is a testament to Kagan’s influence. Einstein (1938) 
once said, “The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution, which may be 
merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new questions, new problems, to 
regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative imagination and marks real advances in 
science.” Throughout his career, Kagan has shown a remarkable knack for asking the right 
questions--often the vital questions about law and politics others had not thought to ask. His own 
work has gone a long way to answering these questions, and he has inspired hundreds of others to 
take up the questions he poses. This has certainly been the case in the study of European regulatory 
styles. By posing a trenchant question others had not thought to ask, “Should Europe worry about 
adversarial legalism?” Kagan triggered a vibrant debate and inspired a wealth of research that 
continues to transform our understanding of European regulatory styles and of the impact of the 
EU on national regulation. 
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